The Strengths and Weaknesses of Integrative Solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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In light of the increasing unlikelihood of a two-state solution, several integrative solutions have been proposed as alternative visions for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Offering a nuanced conceptual map of the various proposals for inclusive, egalitarian political visions for all the inhabitants of Israel/Palestine, this article identifies three strands of integrative approaches: liberal, binational, and shared sovereignty. It critically assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these integrative strands and evaluates integrationists' preference for historical reconciliation as an alternative framework to the peacemaking discourse of the Oslo peace process.

In his testimony before the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee on April 17, 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry said, "I believe the window for a two-state solution is shutting. I think we have some period of time — a year to year-and-a-half to two years, or it's over."[1] Kerry was referring to the destructive and de facto binational conditions that Israeli settlements have been creating in the West Bank.[2] More than three years have passed since Kerry's striking statement; it is striking, among other things, because for the past four decades the dominant political discourse on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been trapped by the logic of partition and statehood.

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1. Harriet Sherwood, "Kerry: Two Years Left to Reach Two-State Solution in Middle East Peace Process," *The Guardian*, April 18, 2013, www.gu.com/world/2013/apr/18/kerry-two-state-solution-middle-east.

2. Since the beginning of the Oslo peace process the number of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has nearly tripled from 250,000 to 700,000. Rather than increasing economic prospects for Palestinian independence, the trade agreements worked out in conjunction with Oslo have created one single economy where Israel collects taxes and customs from the West Bank and Gaza, and places severe controls on imports and exports. Furthermore, Israel's complete control of 60% of the West Bank — Area C, as specified by the 1995 Oslo II Accord — and the institutionalization of security arrangements and coordination between the Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel and the increasing involvement of Israeli defense ministry's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (COGAT) have created complicated institutional intertwinements. Settlement statistics from the Foundation for Middle East Peace were compiled in Philip C. Wilcox, Jr. "America, Israel, and Missed Opportunities for Peace," *The Middle East Journal*, Volume 70, Number 30 (Summer 2016), p. 483. Further details on the economic consequences of Oslo can be found in the article "Revisiting the Paris Protocol: Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations, 1994–2014," by Mohammed Samhouri, featured in this issue. For more on the subdivision of the West Bank and COGAT, see "What Is Area C?" B'Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (updated May 18, 2014), www.btselem.org/area_c/what_is_area_c; COGAT website, www.cogat.idf.il/894-en/Matpash.aspx.

According to this logic, meeting the demands of Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews is best served through partitioning the land of Israel and Palestine into two separate and exclusive nation-states.

The peace process that began with the first Oslo Accord in 1993 has been viewed and long celebrated by many parties as a problem-solving vehicle to settle the conflict and achieve a two-state solution. In light of the deadlock in the Oslo peace process and the increasing level of Israeli and Palestinian territorial, demographic,[3] economic, and institutional intertwinement that have generated a wretched and de facto binational reality,[4] several scholars and political activists have called for shifting the focus from the two-state solution toward integrative solutions that favor various forms of political organization and arrangements.[5] One of the most recent and prominent of these voices has been Yossi Beilin, one of the principal architects of the Oslo Accords. In an op-ed for *The New York Times* on May 14, 2015, he proposed a confederation rather than a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[6]

Integrative solutions are political visions and institutional arrangements that view Israel/Palestine, the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River, as a single historical and political site. Due to practical considerations of existing intertwined realities and normative and moral considerations of democratic rights and values, integrative solutions are based on integration and inclusion rather than on territorial partition and segregation. The past three decades have witnessed a remarkable proliferation of integrative solutions by scholars of various ideological and political creeds, resulting in much confusion. To better understand and assess these integrative approaches, this article proposes a conceptual map that examines the core principles and concepts on which they are built and their institutional configurations.

This article identifies three of the central strands of integrative solutions: liberal, binational, and shared sovereignty. The major differences between these strands stem from their commitments to various, sometimes conflicting, concerns, principles, and in-

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3. In addition to the rising population of settlers in the West Bank, much of the debate about the two-state solution's viability is underpinned by demographic projections that forecast Palestinians will become a majority of the population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea within the next two decades. For more, see Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Trends in Israel and Palestine: Prospects and Policy Implications," *The American Jewish Year Book*, Vol. 103 (2003), pp. 3-68.

4. See for example, Meron Benvenisti, *Halom ha-tsabar ha-lavan: Otobiyografiyah shel hitpak'hut* [The dream of the white sabra: An autobiography of disillusionment] (Jerusalem: Keter, 2012); Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Leila Farsakh, "Independence, Cantons, or Bantusans: Whither the Palestinian State," *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 230–45; Hani Faris, ed., *The Failure of the Two-State Solution: The Prospects of One State in the Israel-Palestinian Conflict* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013); Ali Abunimah, *The Battle for Justice in Palestine* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014).

5. Tony Judt, "Israel: The Alternative," *The New York Review of Books*, October 23, 2003, www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2003/oct/23/israel-the-alternative/; Jamil Hilal, ed., *Where Now for Palestine? The Demise of the Two State Solution* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Danny Rubinstein, "One State/Two States: Rethinking Israel and Palestine," *Dissent*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer 2010), pp. 5–11; Bashir Bashir and Azar Dakwar, eds., *Rethinking the Politics of Israel/Palestine: Partition and Its Alternatives* (Vienna: Bruno Kreisky Forum, 2014).

6. Yossi Beilin, "Confederation Is the Key to Middle East Peace," *The New York Times*, May 14, 2015, http://nyti.ms/2db60DV.

stitutional modalities. The liberal strand emphasizes individual rights and promotes an inclusive and egalitarian state, which represents all of its citizens regardless of their national, religious, or ethnic affiliations. The binational strand recognizes the reality of the existing national and ethnoreligious diversity and calls for democratic designs based on power-sharing, federative arrangements, or some combination thereof within which the various groups enjoy communitarian and national rights. Those advocating for shared sovereignty insist that the answer to the two groups' conflicting claims to self-determination, especially given their intertwinement and strong, exclusive national identities, is an arrangement that is premised on shared power and overlapping territorial jurisdictions. This article critically assesses the weaknesses and strengths of these three strands.

While advocates of integrative solutions usually disagree on the content and shape of their proposals, they often agree that the discourse of peacemaking underlying the Oslo process in Israel/Palestine is problematic. This discourse mainly seeks to sustain the status quo of asymmetrical power relations; fails to convincingly address the central issues of the conflict, such as the occupation, settlements, Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and natural resources; and promotes an amnesiac politics that avoids coming to terms with the historical injustices wrought by the conflict.[7] Thus, advocates of integrative solutions have proposed historical reconciliation as an alternative framework to the Oslo peacemaking discourse. This article explores and evaluates this preference for historical reconciliation.

This article is divided into four sections. The first three assess each strand of integrative solutions: liberal, binational, and shared sovereignty. The final section explores the advantages and disadvantages of historical reconciliation, which integrationists view or implicitly endorse as a prerequisite for implementing integrative solutions.

It is necessary to mention two important caveats and qualifications before we proceed. First, the article limits its focus to significant, surely not all, integrative solutions. Integrative solutions are normatively desirable and defensible for they are based on parity, equality, mutual legitimacy, integration, inclusion, and cooperation and not on exclusion, oppression, discrimination, apartheid, and segregation.[8] Non-integrative alternatives to the two-state solution — such as ethnic cleansing, population exchange, an apartheid-like regime, mere Palestinian autonomy in a Jewish state, the "Jordanian option," or a Palestinian Arab or Islamic state in the entirety of historic Palestine without collective rights given to Israeli Jews — are politically unacceptable and morally indefensible for they are premised on domination, oppression, and denial, and are likely to escalate the conflict rather than mitigate or settle it.

Second, one can differentiate among integrative solutions based on various criteria, such as ideological and institutional preference and tendencies. For the purposes of this article, it is useful to distinguish between two main, often conflated variants within the integrative solutions, namely the descriptive and prescriptive. The former focuses on the existing condition — or to use an Israeli term, "the facts on the ground" — that pose serious challenges to partition and the two-state solution, referring to these conditions as char-

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7. Nadim Khoury, "National Narratives and the Oslo Peace Process: How Peacebuilding Paradigms Address Conflicts over History," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2016), pp. 465–83.

8. On the "Jordanian option" and "Israeli One State Plan," see Benny Morris, *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Caroline B. Glick, *The Israeli Solution: A One State Plan for Peace in the Middle East* (New York: Crown Forum, 2014).

acteristic of a "de facto binational regime," "one-state reality," "one-state condition," and "apartheid."[9] According to former Jerusalem deputy mayor Meron Benvenisti, "binationalism is not a political or ideological program as much as a de facto reality masquerading as a temporary state of affairs."[10] Garry Sussman of Tel Aviv University has argued that a binational state will not emerge from Arabs and Jews setting up a joint campaign for one state, rather, it will emerge because separation is discredited and impossible.[11] The latter variant, the prescriptive, is largely ideological and formulaic and focuses on desired solutions such as a binational state, federation, confederation, or a unitary democratic state.[12] Advocates such as the late historian Tony Judt, political scientist Virginia Tilley, journalist Rachel Shabi, and Palestinian-American activist Ali Abunimah have argued that besides these formulae's ability to better address core issues of the conflict such as Jerusalem, settlements, and borders, integrative solutions also emphasize values and principles such as equal rights, inclusion, and protection of minorities.[13] This article mainly focuses on the prescriptive integrative solutions and maps out the central strands underlying them.

THE LIBERAL STRAND OF INTEGRATIVE SOLUTIONS

Proponents of the liberal strand of integrative solutions place great emphasis on how political legitimacy within a state is derived. Instead of advocating a system that determines membership in the polity according to ethnic lines, which some call an ethnocracy,[14] liberal integrationists argue that a true democracy vests sovereignty in an inclusive political community that is made up of individual citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliations. This political community, known in Ancient Greek as the *demos*, is entitled to self-determination, rather than a particular ethnic community, or *ethnos*. The *demos* entails not only inclusion in the form of undifferentiated "we" but also requires equal distribution

9. David Remnick, "The One-State Reality," *The New Yorker*, November 17, 2014, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/17/one-state-reality; Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, *The One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Jimmy Carter, *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Nancy Murray, "Dynamics of Resistance: The Apartheid Analogy," *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8 (Spring 2008), pp. 132–48.

10. Meron Benvenisti, "United We Stand," *Haaretz*, January 28, 2010, www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/united-we-stand-1.262282.

11. Gary Sussman, "The Challenge to the Two-State Solution," *Middle East Report* (Summer 2004).

12. Virginia Tilley, *The One State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in The Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005); Ahmad Samih Khalidi, "A One-State Solution," *The Guardian*, September 29, 2003, www.gu.com/world/2003/sep/29/comment; Ali Abunimah, *One Country: A Bold Proposal to End Israeli-Palestinian Impasses* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Leila Farsakh, "Time for A Bi-national State," *Le Monde diplomatique*, Mar. 2007, http://mondediplo.com/2007/03/07binational; As'ad Ghanem, "The Binational State Solution," *Israel Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 120–33; Rachel Shabi, "The Death of The Israel-Palestine Two-State Solution Brings Fresh Hope," *The Guardian*, October 23, 2012, www.gu.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/23/israel-palestine-two-state-solution; Ian Lustick, "The Two-State Illusion," *The New York Times*, September 14, 2013, http://nyti.ms/Md4mk1; Antony Loewenstein and Ahmed Moor, eds., *After Zionism: One State for Israel and Palestine* (London: Saqi Books, 2013).

13. George Bisharat, "Israel and Palestine: A True One-State Solution," *The Washington Post*, September 3, 2010, http://wapo.st/2dVs6Np.

14. Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*.

of rights. Many advocates of the liberal strand insist on addressing the existing inequalities and asymmetrical power relations through a process of decolonization that leads to dismantling Jewish privileges and fair redistributions of rights and resources.[15] One of the main underlying assumptions of the two-state solution is that an independent and exclusivist nation-state defined along ethnic affiliations for each national group is the best means to satisfy, secure, and safely exercise the right to national self-determination of the conflicting communities. However, liberal integrationists insist that this notion of self-determination unrealistically assumes that the two peoples are separable when in fact they are entangled and intertwined. The often-rehearsed slogans of a "two-state solution" and "two states for two peoples" are used interchangeably and are based on understanding self-determination as entailing exclusivity and separation. Underlying these statist articulations is an explicit assumption of homogeneity that squeezes out of its consideration a significant indigenous Palestinian minority in Israel, the Palestinian refugees, as well as a growing community of more than half a million Jewish settlers in the West Bank.

Liberal integrationists argue that in light of the impasse in the peace process and the increasing asymmetrical intertwinements of Arabs and Jews in Israel/Palestine, territorial partition and the realization of self-determination through ethnic exclusivity seem to complicate and even possibly contribute to the conflict.[16] This proposed political solution further legitimizes and promotes the discourse and practices of segregation and separation that overlook ever-increasing interlocked realities. Addressing the ethnic exclusivity and statist discourse of the two-state solution through rethinking self-determination along liberal and integrationist lines and dismantling privileges, structural inequalities, and asymmetries of power[17] rest at the core of integrative solutions proposed by scholars and activists like Virginia Tilley, Ali Abunimah, and the late Edward Said. In his 2014 book, *The Battle for Justice in Palestine*, Abunimah placed rethinking self-determination at the center of his call for a single democratic state as a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[18] He goes on to argue that self-determination, and not statehood, remains at the heart of the Palestinian cause. To capture the conditions of dispersion and fragmentation of Palestinians inside and outside of historic Palestine as a result of the refugee crises of 1948 and 1967, Abunimah invoked an earlier work on

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15. Compared to their fellow Arab citizens, Israeli Jews enjoy various privileges that span all fields of public life, both de jure and de facto. For example, the central nationality laws privilege Jewish immigration, giving Jews from around the world rights to citizenship and subsidies while Arab citizens have difficulty transferring their status through marriage or family. Land policy also privilege Jews since the Jewish National Fund, which control 13% of the land in the country, operates explicitly in the Jewish people's interest, and "admissions committees" in around 700 towns and agricultural communities filter out Arab applicants on the ground of their "social unsuitability." For more, including various security measures that affect Israeli Arabs and the vast inequities in government funding, see David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Katie Hesketh et al., "The Inequality Report: The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel," Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (March 2011), www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf.

16. Nicholas Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2000), pp. 437–83.

17. Iris Marion Young, *Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and Responsibility for Justice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 39–57; Balraj Puri, "Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Right of Self-Determination," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2001), pp. 263–64.

18. Abunimah, *Battle for Justice*, pp. 227–34.

the subject by philosopher Tomis Kapitan,[19] noting that, "self-determination belongs not to national groups as national groups, but to the legitimate residents of any region whose status is unsettled."[20] The Palestinian people are collectively entitled to self-determination not through their ethnicity but by virtue of being legitimate residents of historic Palestine. The facts of displacement and forced migration do not undermine the legitimate entitlement of Palestinians and the Palestinian diaspora to participate in their own self-determination. Under this interpretation of self-determination, Israeli Jews are entitled to participate in self-determination not as a distinctive national group but as *individual* legitimate residents, which they only become under the condition of complete decolonization. This understanding of self-determination is inclusive because it is based on territory and rights rather than ethnicity or religion.[21]

Tilley has also advocated for a unitary secular democratic state, rejecting a binational state that would uphold existing identities and reinforce national boundaries between rival groups but within a single state. Therefore, she argued against the attempt to inscribe these national identities and boundaries through "constitutional privileges and protections" or "symmetrical ethno-national rights." She proposed a secular democratic state in which ethnic life is freely pursued, but nationality is not institutionalized.[22] Similarly, Said, another advocate of a unitary secular and democratic state, warned against ethnic and religious exclusivity and called for "the gradual dissolving of ethnic lines."[23]

One of the most significant weaknesses of Tilley's and Abunimah's proposals (and several other liberal integrative solutions) lies in their underestimation of the centrality of nationalism in the conflict and the lack of sensitivity they show to the specificities and experiences of the conflicting parties. Few liberal integrationists base their prescriptions on an ideological commitment to liberalism, but are instead usually motivated by other considerations. Said's and Abunimah's proposals in particular are very strongly inspired by the political program of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from the late 1960s and early 1970s that called for a democratic nonsectarian state for Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Palestine.[24] More broadly, many who adopt these liberal views are attempting to escape or deny the existence of a legitimate Israeli Jewish nationalism. These liberal views bring to attention the oppressive and colonial practices and policies of Zionism and the State of Israel and their disastrous consequences for the Palestinians.[25] However, examining and acknowledging these policies

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19. Tomis Kapitan, "Self-Determination" in *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Philosophical Essays on Self-Determination, Terrorism and the One-State Solution*, eds. Tomis Kapitan and Raja Halwani (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 13–71.

20. Abunimah, *Battle for Justice*, p. 229.

21. Abunimah, *Battle for Justice*, pp. 229–33.

22. Virginia Tilley, "The Secular Solution: Debating Israel-Palestine," *New Left Review*, No. 38 (Mar./Apr. 2006), pp. 37–57; Tilley, *One State Solution*.

23. Edward Said, "Afterword: The Consequences of 1948," in *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, eds. Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 260.

24. For an interesting discussion on this point, see Honaida Ghanim, "Between Two 'One-State' Solutions: The Dialectics of Liberation and Defeat in the Palestinian National Enterprise," *Constellations*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sept. 2016), pp. 340–50.

25. Uri Davis, *Israel: An Apartheid State* (London: Zed Books, 1987); Fayez A. Sayegh, *Zionist Colonialism in Palestine* (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1965); Abunimah, *Battle for Justice*.

and practices while denying the development and formation of an Israeli Jewish national identity that acquired rights, including self-determination, is implausible and premised on epistemological and ontological fallacies and misunderstandings. Jewish nationalism in Israel is a powerful and strong force. Unlike the lack of popularity of the Zionist movement enjoyed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Jewish nationalism in contemporary Israel is very established and enjoys strong support from the overwhelming majority of Jewish communities around the world.[26] Integrative political visions that are incapable of meeting the national claims of Israeli Jews are likely to remain unappealing to the overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews.

Integrative solutions claim that they overcome obstacles that plague the two-state solution — such as drawing borders, dividing Jerusalem, and accommodating the return of Palestinian refugees — by treating the land of Israel/Palestine as one political site that needs to be shared rather than divided. However, advocates of liberal integrative solutions often underestimate the danger of majoritarianism and its possible tyranny. Since, according to the liberal strand, there is only one political community and the Israeli Jews are not recognized as a distinct national group but individual citizens, an electoral system in which the majority decides does not provide compelling guarantees against the discrimination of minorities. Furthermore, largely missing from the integrative solution is the need for a greater mediation between the diagnosis of the existing wretched binational conditions, and the prognosis of visionary solutions through also focusing on the level of actual policy.[27] The practical need for political and social agents, players, forces, and parties to recruit and mobilize followers, adopt, advocate, and seek to achieve ideological and political aims is also not receiving enough attention in integrative solutions.

In other words, liberal integrative solutions entail a paradigmatic shift from a politics of separation to a politics of integration, rendering Palestinians and Israeli Jews internal rather than external to each other. Seeking integration requires the formation of Arab-Jewish partnerships and cooperation that lead joint and common struggles, activities, movements, and parties. Yet, forming Arab-Jewish partnerships and the tools required for mobilization, joint struggles, and actions remain strikingly esoteric and, for some, even unrealistic under the current circumstances. Some scholars have argued that for this partnership to be more appealing and realistic, it should be built on binational ethics that recognize national identities rather than on exclusively individualistic liberal principles that neglect national belonging. As such, true binationalism is likely to enjoy more support among the largely communitarian Arab and Jewish constituencies than liberalism.[28] This argument invites us to closely examine binational solutions.

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26. Chaim Gans, *A Just Zionism: On the Morality of the Jewish State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

27. Some efforts towards this direction can be found in: Faris, ed., *Failure of the Two-State Solution*; Leila Farsakh, "The One State Solution and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 1, (Winter 2011), pp. 55–71; Moshe Behar, "One-State, Two-States, Bi-National State: Mandated Imagination in a Regional Void," *Middle East Studies Online Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2011), pp. 97–135.

28. Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg, "Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba: Disruptive Empathy and Binationalism in Israel/Palestine," *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (2014), pp. 77–99.

THE BINATIONAL STRAND OF INTEGRATIVE SOLUTIONS

Advocates of binational integrative solutions place individual *and* national rights at the center of their considerations, proposing institutional and constitutional designs that realize and protect these rights.[29] They argue that in deeply divided, yet intertwined societies, partition and segregation are infeasible and normatively undesirable. Moreover, they hold that a neutral and liberal state that champions individual rights, majoritarianism, and integration around a cementing and common national identity are hard to achieve. Thus, in order to establish a functioning and stable democracy, binational arrangements are preferable. Such arrangements recognize social cleavages while promoting egalitarian politics, creating power-sharing mechanisms,- decentralizing authority, and forming inclusive coalitions, and yet they still grant autonomy in policy fields. Furthermore, binational systems promote proportional representation within various possible institutional settings (e.g. consociational, federal, and multicultural).

Democratic binational settings, advocates insist, better satisfy the urge for self-determination of Arabs and Jews than the benign neglect of identity concerns inherent in the majoritarianism of a potential liberal state or the secession and partition necessary for a two-state solution. While a two-state solution ignores the deeply intertwined binational realities and the democratic liberal state underestimates the political significance of national affiliations, binational configurations take the existing intertwinement and interdependence seriously.[30] Moreover, they secure the individual and national rights of both national groups. In a 2003 article published in *The New York Review of Books*, Tony Judt declared that the Middle East peace process was dead and that the two-state solution was doomed because of Israel's colonial expansion of settlements, nationalism which he deemed anachronistic, and the unconditional support it receives from the United States.[31]

Judt argued that an integrated binational state of Arabs and Jews between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River was the desirable alternative. He admitted that converting Israel from a Jewish state to a binational one would not be easy, but not impossible since the process already had started in reality. A binational state, according to Judt, would be a challenging mix of realism and utopia that would require the emergence of a new political class of Arabs and Jews believing in a joint and equal dwelling. Judt claimed that Zionism imported from Europe a late 19th century separatist and tribal nationalism that sought to realize Jewish self-determination through the formation of an exclusive Jewish state that privileged Jews over non-Jewish citizens. He insisted that this conception of self-determination was exclusivist, separatist, and statist, and ought to be rethought in light of intermingled realities and in light of more modern ideals individual rights, open frontiers, cultural and ethnic diversity, and international law. The binational state, Judt concluded, was the best alternative to embrace and accommodate these changes.

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29. Tamar Hermann, "The Bi-National Idea in Israel/Palestine: Past and Present," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 381–401.

30. See for example, Lama Abu-Odeh, "The Case for Binationalism," *Boston Review*, December 1, 2001, www.bostonreview.net/forum/lama-abu-odeh-case-binationalism; Judt, "Israel: The Alternative;" Avraham Burg, "Now It's Your Turn," *Haaretz*, December 23, 2011, www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/now-it-s-your-turn-1.403059.

31. Judt, "Israel: The Alternative."

Though he did not fully develop a proposal or schematics for how a binational state would look, in an interview published posthumously, Judt mused:

> Well, there could be a federal state of two autonomous communities — on the Swiss or Belgian model ... . This could have crossover privileges and rights for both communities, but each would be autonomous. I think this would work better than a mixed single-state, and it would allow each community to set certain sorts of religious and other regulations according to its taste.[32]

Judt's brief statement clearly shows a preference for a true binational state over a single mixed state that would champion individual rights. While critical of ethno-nationalism as a whole, Judt recognized the needs of each national grouping to enjoy collective rights and preserve and express certain forms of ethnic particularism. This is markedly different from writers of the liberal strand, who would sometimes use the word "binational,"[33] but would either avoid substantive engagement with Israeli Jewish nationalism (Abunimah), evinced clear preference for a liberalist pluralistic democracy (Said), or were critical of binationalism as a concept outright (Tilley).[34]

Whereas Judt argued that Zionism had to be reexamined in light of failure of the Oslo peace process, Palestinian-American law professor Lama Abu-Odeh argued in a 2001 article that it was Palestinian nationalist goals that were unattainable within the framework of a two-state solution given the nascent intertwined and binational realities and the structure of the Israeli military and political class. Thus, the emerging and most reasonable alternative solution would be a binational state premised on liberal constitutionalism. This alternative vision would require a demanding shift in Palestinian political discourse from the language of nationalism, decolonization, and international law to the language of civil rights. Abu-Odeh argued this shift would offer several promises and gains for Palestinians: by moving the focus of the Palestinian struggle from independence to civil rights, they would be more likely to garner American support and ultimately be able to fare better economically and have access to all of historic Palestine within a binational state.

Abu-Odeh insisted that a binational state could take several institutional forms and modalities. One possible form would be a federal state in which cultural differences could be expressed and pursued, administrative autonomy of the various communities would be granted in certain policy fields, and resources would be redistributed for the purposes of promoting equality among all citizens and addressing the claims of the Palestinians who have been unjustly exiled and dispossessed. Although Abu-Odeh shared ample assumptions with advocates of liberal strands, such as championing individual and civil rights, her federative binational proposal is distinct from and goes beyond the conventional individualistic liberal frame. Put differently, unlike the dominant views among advocates of the liberal strand, which focus primarily on individual rights and underestimate collective

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32. Merav Michaeli, "Tony Judt's Final Word on Israel," *The Atlantic*, September 14, 2011, http://theatln.tc/2dPLs30.

33. Edward Said, "Truth and Reconciliation," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Jan. 14–20, 1999, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/Archive/1999/412/op2.htm; Ali Abunimah, "Can Israel Escape a Binational Future," *The Electronic Intifada*, December 20, 2003, https://electronicintifada.net/content/can-israel-escape-binational-future/4914.

34. Tilley, "Secular Solution," pp. 51–53.

rights and particularities, her binational proposal accommodates power-sharing arrangements, guarantees of various collective rights, and autonomous regions.[35]

Liberal Israeli writers who have opposed binational solutions have argued that these solutions ignore two main arguments in support of Jewish nationalism: the historical and the Zionist.[36] The historical argument maintains that, based on the long, traumatic history of anti-Semitism and persecution, Jews are in need of a safe haven ruled by Jews and one that guarantees Jews veto powers over critical issues. Advocates of binationalism have responded that a binational integrative solution could include power-sharing arrangements and decision-making mechanisms that would provide ample protection and representation for Jews.[37] The Zionist argument is that, like all other nations, Jews are entitled to national self-determination, and that it should be in the Jewish holy land. However, given that theological attachments of Muslims and Christians to the whole land of Israel/Palestine are as intertwined as the political realities, advocates of binational integrative solution insist that these aspirations for self-determination in the Land of Israel and normalization are better met by binational arrangements than by two-state or liberal one-state solutions.[38]

Another Israeli scholar, geographer Oren Yiftachel, argued that a one-state solution, whether binational or liberal, would be largely incompatible with core components of international law, especially those derived from United Nations Security Council resolutions that support the two-state solution and end of Israeli occupation.[39] A Palestinian critic, Salim Tamari, argued that a binational vision ignores the social, political, and institutional modalities that have been created in the West Bank and Gaza since the beginning of the Oslo process and cannot mobilize significant constituencies from either side.[40] This is because the majority of Israeli Jews view the one-state solution as a threat to the existence of Israeli society. The weak support in international law for alternatives to the two-state solution is indeed a powerful challenge to binationalism, though the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine's report that recommended the 1947 Partition Plan also included a substantive minority view that rejected partition and proposed one-state solution.[41] However, the argument that the majority of Israelis support the two-state solu-

35. Abu-Odeh, "Case for Binationalism."

36. Oren Barak, "*Hatsaʿah le-hazon meshutaf Yehudi-ʿAravi be-Medinat Yisraʾel*" ["Towards A Shared Future Vision in the State of Israel"] *Public Sphere*, Vol. 6 (Summer 2012), pp. 95–112; Alexander Yakobson, "Two States or One (Arab) State," *Dissent*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Fall 2010), pp. 14–19.

37. Examples include Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "A National Colonial Theology: Religion, Orientalism and the Construction of the Secular in Zionist Discourse," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte*, No. 30 (2002), pp. 312–26; Bashir and Goldberg, "Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba," pp. 94–95; *A Land of Two Peoples: Martin Buber on Jews and Arabs*, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

38. Jenab Tutunji and Kamal Khaldi, "A Binational State in Palestine: The Rational Choice fo Palestinians and the Moral Choice for Israelis," *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan. 1997), pp. 33–34 and 52–57.

39. Oren Yiftachel, "*Ben ahat li-shetayim: Diyun be-pitron ʿha-medinah ha-ahatʾ mul raʿayon ha-konfederatsiyah le-Yisraʾel/Falastin*" ["Between One and Two: Critique of the One-State-Solution vs. the Confederation Concept for Israel/Palestine," *Public Sphere*, Vol. 6 (Summer 2012), pp. 156–180.

40. Salim Tamari, "The Dubious Lure of Binationalism," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), pp. 83–87.

41. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Vol. 1, Supplement No. 11, September 3, 1947, section III, "Recommendations (III).".

tion because their desire to preserve a Jewish state tends to ignore profound ideological and sociological transformations in Israeli politics and society that have occurred in the past three decades. There has been a dramatic shift toward center- and right-leaning views and ideologies that publicly support the idea of Greater Israel and the annexation of the West Bank.[42] While advocates of "the whole Land of Israel" seek a state that exclusively privileges Jews and Judaism and discriminates against Arab citizens, some important figures, like current Israeli president Reuven Rivlin, entertain more egalitarian and inclusive arrangements in Greater Israel but still insist on certain Jewish privileges.[43] Finally, critics of the binational state, such as prominent Israeli novelist A. B. Yehoshua, argued that binational experiments around the world have failed and represent a surefire source of future conflict.[44] There are numerous examples of binational states in the world; some are successful; others are less so. Binational and multinational arrangements were not successful in states like Yugoslavia but have been fairly successful in countries like Belgium. Similar state structures found in Switzerland, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Spain are largely functioning and prosperous. Therefore, the argument about the failure of binational experiments is exaggerated and lacks decisive empirical evidence.[45] Furthermore, many of the failed examples (i.e., Yugoslavia) that are often invoked did not adopt democracy as a system of government.

THE SHARED SOVEREIGNTY STRAND OF INTEGRATIVE SOLUTIONS

Advocates of the shared sovereignty strand of integrative solutions have placed a huge emphasis on viewing sovereignty as shared and partial rather than absolute and indivisible. They have claimed that political solutions that seek absolute state sovereignty are more likely to increase political conflicts than settle them. The traditional Westphalian notion that views state sovereignty as indivisible is premised on the assumption that nations and peoples are homogeneous, physically disentangled, and spatially divided, when in fact they are heterogeneous and intermingled, and their territorial sovereignties are mangled.[46] Scholars have argued that state sovereignty is limited not only by the rights of other states and the numerous military, political, and economic ties that link

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42. Zeev Sternhell, "The Extreme Right Turned Israel into an Anachronism," *Haaretz*, April 1, 2011, www.haaretz.com/the-extreme-right-turned-israel-into-an-anachronism-1.353451.

43. Remnick, "One-State Reality."

44. A. B. Yehoshua, "An Unwelcome Intro to the Binational State," *Haaretz*, January 2, 2012, www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/an-unwelcome-intro-to-the-binational-state-1.405013.

45. For experiences of bi- and multinationalism in other states, see Kenneth McRoberts, "Canada and the Multinational State," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec. 2001), pp. 683–713; Marc Helbling and Nenad Stojanović, "Switzerland: Challenging the Big Theories of Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct. 2011), pp. 712–17; Wilfried Swenden and Maarten Theo Jans, "'Will It Stay or Will It Go?' Federalism and the Sustainability of Belgium," *West European Politics*, Vol. 29, No. 5 (2006), pp. 877–94; Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 91–119.

46. Mathias Mossberg and Mark LeVine, "The Solution for Israelis and Palestinians: A Parallel State Structure," *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 8, 2010, www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0408/The-solution-for-Israelis-and-Palestinians-a-parallel-state-structure; Nathan Witkin, "The Interspersed Nation-State System: A Two-State/One-Land Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Winter 2011), pp. 31–54.

them but also by the rise of an international human rights regime, an intensive process of globalization, the spread of cosmopolitan norms, and a legitimate international interest in the environment and other issues formerly considered the sole jurisdiction of the state.[47] According to such scholars, shared and partial notions of state sovereignty are more compatible with the contemporary intertwined realities of world politics and serve as a key tool to settle conflicts. They propose to resolve conflicts and accommodate the claims and rights of various groups through complex, multilayered, and overlapping institutional designs within which sovereignty is exercised jointly and partially.

This post-Westphalian notion of shared sovereignty has been central to several integrative solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including creating parallel state structure and confederation. In a 2014 coedited volume by American professor Mark LeVine and retired Swedish diplomat Mathias Mossberg entitled *One Land, Two States*, several activists, scholars, and diplomats argued that viewing sovereignty as shared rather than indivisible paves the way for envisioning a parallel state structure in Israel/Palestine.[48] The parallel state structure is a type of political system that is organized around an innovative notion of dispersed and shared state power according to which two (or more) states exercise jurisdiction in the same territory but each on a separate community of citizens. According to this vision, the entire land of Israel/Palestine would be viewed as one shared land that accommodates two states (Israel and Palestine), where Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs could claim the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River as their own. In other words, this solution seeks to achieve a joint and equal control of the two states over the same political territory without dividing it into exclusive national zones and areas.

Advocates of the parallel state structure insist that their proposals are better than the liberal or binational solutions because it offers advantages that other solutions do not. Parallel states would avoid the risks of a binational or single-state solution in which Jews would lose political power as soon as Palestinians became the majority in the country, as most demographic projections predict. Moreover, it eliminates the problem of establishing a viable Palestinian state on the fragmented territory currently allotted to Palestinians.[49]

The trouble with this argument is that it mistakenly assumes that democratic binational solutions are going to be necessarily based on principles of majoritarian democracy, which affords advantages and privileges to numerical majorities. As it was argued in the previous section, in deeply divided societies characterized by ethnic, religious, national, and cultural diversities, strictly majoritarian models of democracy are inadequate because of the possible tyranny of the majority and the instability that could stem from the failure to effectively accommodate minorities and excluded groups. Instead, scholars have pro-

47. Seyla Benhabib, "Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times," *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2007), pp. 19–36; Hurst Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Mar. 1996), pp. 77–103.

48. Mark LeVine and Mathias Mossberg, eds., *One Land, Two States: Israel and Palestine as Parallel States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014). Similar proposals that are based on viewing sovereignty as shared rather than absolute include Lev Grinberg, "The Israeli-Palestinian Union: The 1–2–7 States Vision of the Future," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Winter 2010), pp. 46–53.

49. Mathias Mossberg, "One Land, Two States? Parallel States as an Example of 'Out of the Box' Thinking on Israel/Palestine," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Winter 2010), pp.40–45.

posed binational solutions that promote federal and consociational arrangements.[50]

Furthermore, while advocates of a parallel state structure take seriously the emerging binational realities of intertwinements in Israel/Palestine that have led to the demise and even implausibility of the two-state solution, their innovative, nonterritorial structure is premised on a strikingly abstract notion of sovereignty that would be very hard and complicated to realize practically and institutionally. Furthermore, the insistence on having two states, though hybrid and abstract in their shape, demonstrates that their model is much closer to a confederation than they are willing to acknowledge, yet, with one major difference: a confederation seems to be more feasible and practical to implement institutionally than a parallel state structure. This is particularly true because a confederative solution, like that proposed by former Israeli justice minister Yossi Beilin, would allow for an independent Israel and an independent Palestine, each with its own parliament and government to allow both parties to realize their self-determination. At the same time, by having the states be territorial units within a confederation, they would have joint institutions for issues that affect both, such as infrastructure, environmental protection, water usage, and police and emergency services.[51]

Another recent initiative that is also premised on a revised notion of sovereignty, yet more detailed than Beilin's brief and vague proposal, is the "Two States in One Homeland" plan.[52] This initiative proposes the creation of two independent and democratic states that enter into a voluntary union based on complex yet flexible systems of cooperation in the fields of governance, security, economy, and infrastructure.[53] For example, roads, railways, water, and energy infrastructure can be shared. According to this proposal, sharing this infrastructure would not only be economical but has been already happening for years. Furthermore, the plan suggests that Palestinians and Israelis would enjoy freedom of movement and access throughout the entire land. Under this proposal, Jewish settlers would remain in the West Bank as residents of Palestine, but citizens of Israel. Likewise, Israel would recognize Palestinian refugees' right to return, but living in Israel as permanent residents while having Palestinian citizenship. Jerusalem would serve as a capital for both states, and a joint municipality would be created.

This initiative, the "Two-States, One Homeland" proposal, is strikingly similar to the two-state solution but packaged differently. It is a rather conservative proposal in the sense that it does not seek to transform many of the existing material conditions (mainly the colonization of the West Bank) and implicitly draws a distorted and false parity between the two conflicting parties.[54] Furthermore, this proposal remains vague when it comes to one of the most important and defining issues of the conflict, namely

50. As'ad Ghanem and Dan Bavly, *Towards a Binational Homeland for Israelis and Palestinians: In Search of Doable Solution — A United Democracy* (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015).

51. Beilin, "Confederation Is the Key."

52. For more on these initiatives, see Israel-Palestine Creative Regional Initiatives, "Two States in One Space: A New Proposed Framework for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (Nov. 2014); the website of Two States, One Homeland, http://2states1homeland.org/; Yiftachel, "*Ben ahat li-shetayim*" ["Between One and Two"]; Dahlia Scheindlin and Dov Waxman, "Confederalism: A Third Way for Israel-Palestine," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2016), pp. 83–94.

53. For a fairly similar idea, see Grinberg, "Israeli-Palestinian Union."

54. Yuval Eylon, "An Israeli-Palestinian Confederation? Not So Fast," *+972*, June 19, 2016, http://972mag.com/an-israeli-palestinian-confederation-not-so-fast/120139/.

the Palestinian refugees. Not only does the proposal require the return of only an insignificant number of Palestinian refugees to beecome noncitizen residents of the State of Israel so as to maintain a Jewish demographic majority, but it also draws an equivalence between Israeli settlers and Palestinian refugees. Among other things, this equation contradicts international law, which views the settlers and their communities as illegal and the Palestinian refugees as being entitled to a right of return.[55]

Additionally, while the proposal expresses a commitment to democratic principles and recognizes Palestinians in Israel as a national minority, the underlining parameters of this proposal seek to preserve the Jewish character and majority of the State of Israel. The attentiveness of this proposal to the collective national rights of the Israeli Jews is one of its strengths. Even so, the proposal remains trapped in the statist logic of self-determination according to which the interests of each *ethnos* (Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs separately) rather than a *demos* (the citizenry). In short, this proposal comes closer to the two-state solution than its advocates are willing to admit, without providing compelling answers to the existing and wretched binational realities and the formative core issues such as the settlements and Palestinian refugees. Finally, advocates of this proposal do not provide a detailed and comparative explanation and analysis to demonstrate the advantages of their proposal over other competing proposals, such as a binational state or federation.

PEACEMAKING AND HISTORICAL RECONCILIATION

Advocates of integrative solutions from all strands have argued that the Oslo peacemaking discourse in Israel/Palestine has been problematic because it has largely sought to maintain the status quo and manage the conflict rather than settle it. This paradigm presupposes formal equality even though the two conflicting parties are strikingly unequal and embedded in asymmetrical power relations. Furthermore, the Oslo discourse has failed to convincingly address the core issues of the conflict — such as the occupation, settlements, Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and natural resources — through suspending the discussion of them and focusing instead on economic, development, and security matters. As such, the peace process has avoided coming to terms with the historical injustices wrought by the conflict through focusing on present inequalities and achieving structural changes.[56]

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55. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are considered illegal by the overwhelming majority of countries in the world, citing Articles 27 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949). Under these articles it is unlawful for an occupying power to transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies. Meanwhile the right of Palestinian refugees to return is specifically laid out in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948), paragraph 11. For further discussion on the right of return, see John Quigley, "Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return," *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 171–229.

56. Nadim Rouhana, "Group Identity and Power Asymmetry in Reconciliation Processes: The Israeli-Palestinian Case," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2004), pp. 33–52; The Palestine Strategic Study Group, "Regaining the Initiative: Palestinian Strategic Options to End Israeli Occupation" (Aug. 2008), p. 16; Menachem Klein, *The Shift: Israel-Palestine from Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict* (London: Hurst, 2010); Ian S. Lustick, "The Oslo Agreement as an Obstacle to Peace," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 61–66; Hilde H. Waage, "Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent," *Journal of Palestine Studies,* Vol. 34, No. 4 (Summer 2005), pp. 6–24.

Advocates of integrative solutions claim that the components of the Oslo Accords have not provided a fully satisfactory answer to historical injustices and grievances, asymmetrical power relations, demographic and economic intertwinements, and political violence experienced by both sides of the conflict.[57] Instead of utilizing the Oslo discourse, many of the integrative solutions (e.g. "Two States, One Homeland;" "Alternatives to Partition;" "One State Declaration"[58]) call for historical reconciliation.

The politics of reconciliation exceed the familiar core requirements of the peacemaking discourse and represent a force that has the potential of generating social and political changes based on mutual legitimacy, recognition of asymmetries, and coming to terms with past injustices, thus laying the foundations for an inclusive, and often collaborative, political order.[59] Advocates of integrative solutions have argued that, contrary to several problem-solving approaches that are excessively forward-looking, reconciliation is simultaneously a backward- and forward-looking enterprise.[60] In its backward-looking perspective, reconciliation significantly engages with the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the consequences of its intractable core issues through its emphasis on memory, acknowledgement, taking responsibility, and offering apologies and reparations.

The Oslo peace process has promoted an amnesic and excessively forward politics through setting aside or minimizing the role of historical injustices and memories of dispossession and expecting Palestinians to enter the peace process as an equal party to Israel.[61] Therefore, the demand of abstracting or suspending a significant part of their history and present condition ignores or downplays the specific and defining experiences of dispossession and domination that Palestinians have been enduring as a result of the 1948 war. Neutralizing history or suspending large parts of it through reducing the conflict to the war of 1967 and its consequences, as happened in the Oslo Accords,[62] ignores the centrality of the formative years of the conflict around 1948 and conceals the striking disparities and inequalities between the Israeli and Palestinian parties. Advocates of integrative solutions claim that the politics of reconciliation provides a platform for memories and experiences of dispossession to counter the hegemonic Zionist narratives[63] and to acknowledge, account for, and repair the injustices of the 1948 war.[64]

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57. See, for example, Bashir Bashir, "Where Now for Israel/Palestine?" in *Rethinking the Politics of Israel/Palestine*, eds. Bashir and Dakwar, pp. 6–11.

58. The One State Declaration, issued in 2007, is available at https://electronicintifada.net/content/one-state-declaration/793. The Bruno Kreisky Forum Initiative's "Alternatives to Partition" was printed in Bashir and Dakwar, eds., *Rethinking the Politics of Israel/Palestine*, pp. 131–33.

59. Ernesto Verdeja, *Unchopping A Tree: Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Political Violence* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009), pp. 33–52.

60. Bashir Bashir, "Reconciling Historical Injustices: Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reconciliation," *Res Publica*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May 2012), pp. 140–141.

61. Said, "Afterword: The Consequences of 1948," p. 257.

62. Zinaida Miller, "Settling with History: A Hybrid Commission of Inquiry for Israel/Palestine," *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, Vol. 20 (2007), p. 295; Khoury, "National Narratives."

63. Indeed, some Israeli scholars — mostly those known as the "New Historians" and "Critical Sociologists," such as Benny Morris, Tom Segev, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappé, and Baruch Kimmerling — have also challenged and questioned the Israeli Zionist mainstream narrative. See, for example, Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

64. Bashir Bashir, "Neutralizing History and Memory in Divided Societies: The Case of Making Peace in Palestine/Israel," in *The Goodness Regime*, ed. Jumana Manna and Sille Storihle (2016), pp. 20–27; Rouhana, "Group Identity and Power Asymmetry in Reconciliation Processes," pp. 41, 44.

Advocates of integrative solutions such as Abunimah, Yoav Peled, and Nadim Rouhana, and the Israeli group Zochrot maintain that acknowledging historical injustices and taking responsibility are of great significance, not only because of a moral responsibility to admit one's wrongs but also because of the demand and need to repair these wrongs. Reparations require, among other things, the setting of mechanisms through which material resources will be redistributed according to principles of restorative justice.[65] Additionally, offering reparations goes beyond distributive changes; it entails an apology and a set of symbolic activities, such as the creation of national symbols, public holiday, museums, memorials, and the introduction of new curricula in the education system to commemorate these past injustices.[66] The task of these activities is not to romanticize and perpetuate guilt or victimhood but to help citizens to differently understand their history and its connection to the current political, social, and economic inequalities.

Proponents of integrative solutions claim that within the frame of historical reconciliation, Palestinians require a sincere apology from the State of Israel for the historical injustices imposed upon them by the war of 1948 and the war of 1967.[67] Indeed, reparations, though its main and major recipients are the dispossessed, colonized, and oppressed Palestinians, should also accommodate legitimate claims of individual Israelis who have suffered injustices as a result of Palestinian resistance and violence. A reconciliation that traces the causes of the conflict back to 1948 and comes to terms with the historical injustices require treating the entire land of the pre-1948 Mandate of Palestine as one political unit.

Proponents of integrative solutions claim that as a forward-looking enterprise, reconciliation also seeks to achieve mutual legitimacy and create an egalitarian political order under conditions of nascent asymmetrical and intertwined binationalism.[68] Mutual denial and delegitimization has governed the political discourse of mainstream Palestinian nationalism and Zionism for decades. With the beginning of the Oslo peace process, both parties have moved to a more accommodationist approach, according to which some form of coexistence and mutual acceptance has developed mostly on pragmatic grounds. This accommodationist approach of the peacemaking discourse has been criticized, because, among other things, it has failed to address the wretched asymmetry of power relations and did not aspire to move toward achieving substantive recognition and mutual granting of legitimacy.[69] The latter is a more ambitious requirement. It entails coming to terms with the individual and national rights and identities of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

65. Abunimah, *Battle for Justice*, p. 233; website of the organization Zochrot, http://zochrot.org/en; Yoav Peled and Nadim N. Rouhana, "Transitional Justice and the Right of Return of the Palestinian Refugees," *Theoretical Inquires in Law*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2004), pp. 317–32.

66. On taking responsibility and offering an apology, see: Lawrie Balfour, "Reparations after Identity Politics," *Political Theory*, Vol. 33, No. 6 (Dec. 2005), pp. 786–811.

67. See, for example, Gershon Shafir, "Reflections on the Right of Return: Divisible or Indivisible?" in *Exile and Return: Predicaments of Palestinians and Jews*, eds. Ann M. Lesch and Ian S. Lustick (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p. 311.

68. Bashir, "Reconciling Historical Injustices," pp. 130–34.

69. Edward Said, "What Price Oslo?," *Counter Punch,* March 23, 2002, www.counterpunch.org/2002/03/23/what-price-oslo/.

Beside the oft-repeated commentary on the colonial and imperialist character of Zionism and claims that Jews do not qualify as a national group,[70] there have been few attempts by Palestinian advocates of integrative solutions to further explore and revisit these claims. There has also been very little grappling with the considerable challenges that have emerged from the last 70 years of societal, economic, cultural, and political developments of Jewish presence in Israel/Palestine.[71] From the perspective of reconciliation, engaging with the Jewish question and Jews' rights and identity in historic Palestine is a moral and normative requirement and a pressing political necessity. Under conditions of historical reconciliation that insist on mutual legitimacy, Palestinians must also recognize and respect Jewish rights, most prominent among these is the right to national self-determination. Such recognition of Israeli/Jewish national self-determination would not need to mean the negation of the Palestinian right to self-determination, nor does it need to be territorially bound to one part of the country.

Although one can identify various frameworks through which Zionist ideology has engaged with Palestinians — "the iron wall," confrontation, and ad hoc and imposed accommodation — denial or misrecognition of the existence of a Palestinian national identity has been a leading strand within Zionism.[72] Surely, in later stages, central strands within the Zionist movement have moved toward a more accommodationist approach. However, this approach falls short of fully recognizing Palestinians as an equal, legitimate nation entitled to the same set of rights, as mainstream Israeli politicians continue to propose either an enhanced national autonomy or a fragmented, territorially discontinuous Palestinian state on less than 22% of historic Palestine as the adequate solutions to the conflict. Reconciliation demands coming to terms with Palestinian rights, nationalism, and the historical injustices they have endured.

One should, however, acknowledge the various practical, material, and psychological challenges facing historical reconciliation. Surely, bringing the more powerful actors to face their history, relinquish their privileges, and reconcile with the oppressed, and encouraging the oppressed to take responsibility for their mistakes and understand their oppressors' fears both remain daunting challenges. Indeed, considerably increasing the moral, political, and economic costs and burdens of sustaining the existing

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70. Sayegh, *Zionist Colonialism in Palestine*; Davis, *Israel: An Apartheid State*.

71. Raef Zreik, "When Does a Settler Become a Native? (With Apologies to Mamdani)," *Constellations*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sept. 2016), pp. 351–64.

72. "The iron wall" refers to a policy first proposed in 1923 by Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky, the intellectual forerunner of today's Likud party, and came to be accepted by a wide spectrum of mainstream Zionist organizations and parties. According to this policy the only way that the necessary peace agreement with the Arabs could ever be attained was if a metaphorical iron wall of Jewish military force were to be erected. This "wall" would be so strong that Arab enemies trying to break through it would experience continuous dreadful defeats, forcing Arabs to relinquish any hope that the Jewish national home could ever be destroyed.

For more, see: Ian Lustick, "Abandoning the Iron Wall: Israel and 'The Middle Eastern Muck,'" *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 30–56; Ian S. Lustick, "To Build and to Be Built By: Israel: and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall," *Israel Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 196–223. For more constructive forms of Jewish engagement with the Palestinians, see David N. Myers, *Between Jew and Arab: The Lost Voice of Simon Rawidowicz* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2008). On denial and misrecognition, see: Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians* (New York: Croom & Helm, 1979), pp. 11–189; Ilan Pappé, *The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge* (New York: Verso, 2014), pp. 27–47.

exclusionary and oppressive political constellations — as protests and sanctions did in the South African case[73] — will be crucial for transitioning to a new and more egalitarian political and social order. More specifically, both internal (civil disobedience and organized joint struggles against discrimination and oppression) and external (international isolation and sanctions) forms of pressure are critical for dismantling the existing oppressive system and transforming asymmetrical power relations.[74] In the current international political climate, exerting these pressures remains a serious challenge.

Another profound challenge to historical reconciliation and implementing an integrative solution relates to the attitudes and psychology of those involved in the conflict. Those who hold this view go on to insist that the intractable and violent conflict between Palestinians and Israeli Jews has generated many psychological barriers and mutual distrust, hatred, and fear. Therefore, in a conflict that is immensely loaded emotionally and psychologically and orchestrated by hegemonic concepts of mutual exclusivity, historical reconciliation that seeks a joint future based on partnership is idealistic and blind to profound emotional and cognitive constructions. It is therefore going to be a tremendous challenge to change the minds and hearts of the people who are involved in a hostile, protracted, and complicated conflict. However, historical evidence clearly shows that shifting the hearts and minds of people who are deeply embedded in such violent conflict is indeed difficult, but it is also possible. Under conditions of oppression, fear, and conflict, the humanistic vision of an egalitarian, democratic, and inclusive South Africa was viewed as an idealist, utopian, or excessively optimistic vision.[75] Undoubtedly, each case has its own history, particularities, and specificities, and we should be careful not to heavily draw on historical precedents. Nevertheless, this example and others show the great potential implicit in humanistic, inclusive, integrative, and just visions to transform peoples' views and attitudes in a context of increasing intertwinement.

CONCLUSION

More than 20 years since the 1993 Oslo Accord, international discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process still advocates a two-state solution. However, this discourse relies on outdated notions of self-determination and ignores the wretched, asymmetrical binational realities created by decades of the Israeli policy of building illegal settlements in the West Bank. The lives, rights, identities, histories, and cultures of Arabs and Jews in Israel/Palestine have become deeply intertwined and almost inseparable. Taking these empirical observations seriously has led several scholars and politicians to offer integrative solutions. At the core of these integrative solutions is a new political and moral grammar that is premised on integration, joint habitation, and mutual legitimacy rather than on segregation, denial, and separation. This article has sought to critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of central integrative solutions.

73. Håkan Thörn, "The Meaning(s) of Solidarity: Narratives of Anti-Apartheid Activism," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2009), pp. 417–36.

74. Rouhana, "Group Identity and Power Asymmetry in Reconciliation Processes," p. 40.

75. Desmond Tutu, *No Future Without Forgiveness* (New York: Doubleday, 1999); Antjie Krog, *Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1998).

The strengths of various strands of integrative solutions stem from, among other things: first, their ability to accommodate the major claims of the two conflicting parties; second, the attention and respect they pay to democratic values as well as to individual and collective national rights; third, the responses they provide to the realities of increased asymmetrical intertwinement and interdependence of the two communities and to the unfeasibility of separation and partition in various major domains; and fourth, their normalizing the existence and rights of Israeli Jews and realizing Palestinians' rights and respecting their aspirations, rights, and historical memories.[76]

The main weaknesses of integrative solutions include: first, despite the growing literature and public discourse on the demise of the two-state solution, integrative solutions have not hitherto garnered much attention or support from either international-legal or influential diplomatic circles; second, the persistence of psychological barriers premised on xenophobia, lack of trust and fear that fosters separation and closure; third, the distorted symmetry of power relations presupposed in some integrative schemes and the possible difficulties of dismantling a deeply rooted, socially accepted, and state-sanctioned system of Jewish privilege in the State of Israel; fourth, the lack of a credible popular base for joint Arab-Jewish political movements and organizations that advocate integrative visions and mobilize influential constituencies to support these solutions.

The three strands of integrative solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict identified in this article — the liberal, binational, and shared sovereignty approaches — tend to favor historical reconciliation as a framework for achieving peace, in contrast to the agreement-based peacemaking of the Oslo discourse. The double temporality (backward- and forward-looking) of the politics of reconciliation refuses to bowdlerize the past, refers to the formative years of the conflict around 1948, and treats the whole territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea — with its intertwined social, demographic, and economic conditions — as one historical and geopolitical unit. However, the stubborn psychological barriers and the difficulty to relinquish socioeconomic and political privileges pose serious challenges to historical reconciliation.

This article's conceptual map and assessments of various strands of integrative approaches contributes to identifying fruitful areas for further research and comparative and mutual learning. For example, there is much to learn from South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle and Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as Belgium's binational and consociational experience. Furthermore, mapping out various reasonable scenarios and critically examining the conditions under which it is possible to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of integrative approaches are useful and necessary academic and political endeavors.

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76. Bashir Bashir, "On Citizenship and Citizenship Education: A Levantine Approach and Reimaging Israel/Palestine," *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 19, Nos. 6/7 (2015), pp. 502–19.